A matter of foresight:how practices enable (or impede) organizational foresightfulness by Sarpong, David et al.
        
Citation for published version:
Sarpong, D, Maclean, M & Davies, C 2013, 'A matter of foresight: how practices enable (or impede)
organizational foresightfulness', European Management Journal, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 613-625.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2013.03.004
DOI:
10.1016/j.emj.2013.03.004
Publication date:
2013
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
 1 
 
A matter of foresight: How practices enable (or impede) organizational 
foresightfulness 
David Sarpong 
Bristol Business School 
University of the West of England, Bristol, UK 
David2.Sarpong@uwe.ac.uk  
 
Mairi Maclean 
University of Exeter Business School 
University of Exeter, UK 
K.Maclean@exeter.ac.uk   
 
Clayton Davies 
Bristol Business School 
University of the West of England, Bristol, UK 
Clayton.Davies@uwe.ac.uk    
 
Published as: Sarpong, D., Maclean, M. & Davies, C. (2013). A matter of foresight: How 
practices enable (or impede) organizational foresightfulness. European Management Journal, 
31(6): 613-625. 
Abstract 
Emphasizing practice as the site of the emergence of strategic foresight, this paper draws on the 
contemporary turn to 'practice' to examine how the organizing practices of members positioned 
further down the organization may facilitate (or constrain) their ability to enact foresightful actions. 
Adopting a case-based approach, three software companies engaged in four new product 
development projects served as our empirical research sites. With emphasis placed on their 
innovation teams’ everyday practices, data for the empirical inquiry were collected using the 
qualitative methods of semi-structured interviews, ethnographical observation and project archival 
documents. Explicating the observed foresightful practices and their underlying activities under 
the general rubrics of organizing architecture and social co-ordination, we identified over-
compartmentalization, over-determinism and (in)congruence-of-values as quintessentially 
embedded organizing practices, that constitutively enable (or impede) organizational 
foresightfulness. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the managerial implications and some 
limitations of our research.  
 
Introduction 
Strategic foresight is crucial to organizational success in rapidly changing environments 
(Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2006; Constanzo, 2004; Manu, 2007) and especially important in 
contexts of greater complexity and genuine uncertainty where interventions cannot be prescribed 
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in advance (Boisot and McKelvey, 2006; Mendonça, et al., 2009). This has triggered research 
interest in analyzing the wider social, historical, and intellectual context within which foresight 
emerges or fails (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008; Turner, 1976). The current interest in strategic foresight 
results from two key drivers. First, organizations want to understand the potential implications of 
emerging technological trajectories and overcome the limits on their ability to prepare for an 
unknown future (Constanzo and Mackay, 2010; Rigby and Bilodeau, 2007; Tsoukas and Shepherd, 
2004a), and, second, empirical evidence suggests strategic foresight could lead to flexible, but 
desirable organizational outcomes such as adaptive learning (Antonacopoulou, 2010), 
ambidexterity (Bodwell and Chermack, 2010) and innovation (Drew, 2006; van der Duin and den 
Hartigh, 2009). 
 It is fair to note among these streams of studies the existence of a tacit assumption that 
top managers are the sole source of organizational ‘foresightfulness’. This locus-related attribution 
has led to a burgeoning literature exploring the cognitive and psychological factors that may enable 
(or impede) the cultivation of managerial foresight (Booth et al., 2009; Day and Schoemaker, 2004; 
Mackay and McKieran, 2004). However, this locus-related attribution tends to discount the 
contribution of people positioned further down in the organization to organizational foresight. 
Although recent research has highlighted and irrevocably link everyday situated activities and 
micro-interactions of organizational members to organizational foresight (Andriopoulos, 2006; 
Cunha et al., 2006), questions remain concerning how these practices may contribute to the 
emergence of organizational foresight. These questions are often sidestepped due to the theoretical 
and methodological complexities involved in mapping the tasks, connections and architectures 
that foresight processes require. Drawing on activity theory, Waehrens and Riis (2010) observe 
that rigid activity systems and weak ties between organizational subsystems which often constrain 
the interactions between emerging social practices and an organization’s strategic intent is 
responsible for the inadequate understanding and enactment of foresight in organisations. Yet still, 
little is known not just about when organizational members take foresightful action – “action in 
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conditions of limited knowledge concerning both the extent to which future events may be 
anticipated and how to deal with them” (Tsoukas and Shephered, 2004b:7), but also how the 
potential organising practices of organizational members positioned further down the organization 
may enable or constrain organizational foresight. We concur that such knowledge would be 
relevant in helping organizations successfully to manage their micro-level activities as they seek to 
balance their need to compete in the present and prepare for an unknown future (Abell, 1999). 
 In response to this challenge, this paper seeks to explore the potential for situated 
organizing practices to foster (or hamper) organizational foresight. We argue that the routines 
behaviours, activities and organising practices of ‘ordinary’ organization members have a genuine 
epistemological relevance to the theory and practice of organizational foresight. The paper 
contributes to the literature on strategic foresight in the following ways: First, while prior research 
has stressed factors that contribute to the enactment or failure of managerial foresight, this paper 
draws on the practice turn in contemporary social theory to explore how the situated practices and 
activities of ‘ordinary’ organizational members may enable or constrain organizational foresight. 
Second, employing a qualitative case-study approach, the paper opens up new possibilities for 
rethinking why some organizations may be more ‘foresightful’ than others. We develop our 
contribution in the context of the software industry which is driven by radical innovations, 
complex technologies and an uncertain market (Easingwood et al., 2006; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 
1995). The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the salient literature on the practice 
and failure of strategic foresight is discussed. Following this, we present a practice approach to 
strategic foresight after which we explain our research methodology. Next, we present our 
findings. The paper concludes with a discussion of our findings and the implications of the 
research for theory and practice. 
Strategic foresight: Enablers and inhibitors  
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In the face of intense global competition and higher customer expectations, the term ‘foresight’ 
has enjoyed a sustained rise to prominence in organising. Referring to foresight as a human 
attribute, Chia (2004: 22) frames it as a “refined sensitivity for detecting and disclosing invisible, 
inarticulate or unconscious societal motives, aspirations, and preferences and of articulating them 
in such a way to create novel opportunities hitherto unthought and hence unavailable to a society 
or organization”. Recently, several studies have highlighted the process nature of foresight and the 
constructive processes underpinning organizational foresight. Slaughter (1995: 48), for example, 
delineates foresight as “[a] a process that attempts to broaden the boundaries of perceptions in 
four ways: by assessing the implications of present actions, decisions, etc (consequent assessment); 
by detecting and avoiding problems before they occur (early warning and guidance); by considering 
the present implications of possible future events (proactive future formulation); [and] by 
envisioning aspects of desired futures (normative scenarios)”. The processual perspective, 
therefore, is grounded in the widespread recognition that foresight is not a positivistic science but 
rather a contextual process of ‘way-finding’ driven by anticipation, imagination, continuous 
probing, and the enactment of the future (Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2006; Constanzo and Mackay, 
2010; Tsoukas and Shepherd, 2004a). This has led to the promotion of scenario planning (van der 
Heidjen, 1996), counterfactual analysis (Booth et al., 2009), peripheral visioning (Brown, 2004), 
competitive intelligence (Neugarten, 2003) and scenario thinking (Wright and Cairns, 2011), as 
some of the foresight practices that can help organizations to prepare for the future.  
 The current paradigm is deeply rooted in the assumption that top managers are solely 
responsible for organizational foresight (Schwandt and Gorman, 2004). Hence, recurrent themes 
on recent theory have increasingly focused on the cognitive capabilities of managers (e.g. Mackay 
and McKiernan, 2004) as a potential resource to explain the enactment or failure of organizational 
foresight. This has brought to the fore the consequences of faulty managerial reasoning as a 
potential antecedent to the illusion of control which destroys organizational competencies. For 
example, Chermack (2004) argues that over-reliance on ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1982) 
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restricts the development of coherent ‘pictures’ of the future. This may happen especially when 
the organization is enjoying relative success with its current strategy. Bounded rationality as defined 
by Morecroft (1983: 133) implies the “severe limitations on the information processing and 
computing abilities of human decision makers”.  Here, managers may manifest cognitive inertia, 
and get entrapped in obsolete assumptions, schemas, expectancies, inferential processes and 
mental models that blind them to perceive and enact emerging reality. Thus, while strategic 
foresight challenges normative assumptions, thereby reducing bounded rationality, the reliance on 
bounded rationality in itself is a major obstacle to developing foresightful actions.  
 Similarly, studies have examined some psychological barriers to organizational foresight 
with emphasis on top managers (e.g. Mackay and McKiernan, 2004; Wright et al, 2005). Giving 
ontological priority to trans-individual values and beliefs in theorizing organization cognition, this 
stream of studies often cite ‘group think’ phenomenon − “a mode of thinking that people engage 
in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity 
overrides their motivation to realistically appraise alternative course of action” (Janis, 1982: 9), as 
the prevalent barrier to emergent foresight processes. A failed foresight exercise reported by 
Hodgkinson and Wright (2002) adds to the growing empirical support for these theoretical 
observations. Additionally, hindsight bias (over-exaggeration of the likelihood of predicting an 
outcome before its occurrence) and foresight bias (an over-simplified view of the future) have 
been found to restrict foresightful actions in practice (e.g. Davies, 1987; Mackay and McKiernan, 
2004b; Mackay et al., 2006; Williams, 2006).  
 Recent theorizing on strategic foresight has concentrated on managerial perception and 
enactment of the likely future, and how they come to change subsequent behaviour (Ilmola and 
Kuusi, 2006; Mackay, 2009; Tsoukas, 2004; Weick, 1996). Of particular significance in these studies 
is the proposition that organizational actors have a penchant for placing excessive emphasis on 
the past or the future, which tends to restrict their ability to spot subtle changes in the present, 
entrapping them in obsolete assumptions, schemas, expectancies, inferential processes and mental 
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models. Hence, managers formulate hypotheses based on their extant prejudices which can be 
supported by supposedly compelling evidence. This gives rise to visions of the future which lead 
to path dependencies (Schwartz, 2005). 
 The brief review of the literature provided above demonstrates interesting insight into the 
enactment and failure of organizational foresight. Even though scholarly interest in the 
relationship between organizational practices and organizational foresight has persisted for some 
time (Cunha et al, 2006; Tsoukas and Shepherd, 2004c; Waehrens and Riis, 2001), empirical work 
exploring the contingency role of ‘ordinary’ organizational members in enabling or impeding 
organizational foresight is sparse. We extend this line of research by examining the organizing 
practices of ‘ordinary’ organizational members to explore how they may strengthen (or hinder) the 
cultivation of organizational foresight. Emphasizing practices as the site of emergence of 
foresightful actions, the foresight literature has produced evidence that organizational practices are 
relevant for understanding strategic foresight (e.g. Cunha et al., 2006; Sarpong, 2011; Sarpong and 
Maclean, 2011, Waehrens and Riis, 2001). A practice approach, we argue, could help extend our 
understanding as to how the everyday practices of organizational members positioned further 
down the organization may enable (or prevent) organizational foresight to ensure continuous 
survival in rapidly changing environments. 
 
 
 
A practice approach to strategic foresight  
We propose to draw on the ‘practice turn’ in contemporary social theory as an alternative 
theoretical lens to help us understand strategic foresight. Contributing to futures ‘becoming’ and 
to the understanding of people’s subjective experiences and their shared theories on social life, 
practices help to fill the deep epistemic gap between what people say they do and what they actually 
do (Barnes, 2001; Bourdieu, 1990). The theory of practice is concerned with the taken-for-granted 
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sense of space and routines of actors as inscribed in the ways they enact their practices (Schatzki, 
2005). In this regard Reckwitz (2002: 249) describes a ‘practice’ as a “routinized type of behaviour 
which consists of several elements, interconnected to one another: forms of bodily activities, forms 
of mental activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, 
know how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge”. For Foucault (1988: 102-103, cited in 
Malave, 1998), practices are “those places where ways of doing and speaking meet and 
interconnect, and which ‘possesses’ up to appoint their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, 
self evidence and ‘reason’”.  
 Temporally unfolding and permeating all social life, we argue that practices have a genuine 
epistemological relevance to the theory and practice of foresight because they are not only 
constituted in language and ongoing interactions (Sarpong and Maclean, 2011), but also shape and 
give rise to the bundles of everyday ‘doings’ of actors in their situated activities (Schatzki, 2005; 
2001). Strategic foresight as a human capacity to connect past, present and the future to cope with 
uncertainties, we argue, is a social practice played out in the everyday situated work of 
organizational actors as an actualization of a continuous process of becoming (Tsoukas and Chia, 
2002; see also Maclean et al., 2012). From this perspective, strategic foresight emerges as an 
ongoing social practice whose routines and activities are enacted on an everyday basis, sometimes 
with very little reflection, from an unintended action to an unintended outcome in the moment. A 
practice approach to strategic foresight therefore gives ontological priority to those regular 
discernible patterns of activities that take place within the ambit of the praxis of actors. 
Epistemological primacy is placed on the actors’ quest to understand the future of their complex 
business environment, which is characterized by uncertainty, serving to condition the actors’ 
behaviour and conduct in their everyday situated practice. 
 Driven by these assumptions, we conceptualize strategic foresight in this study as the 
bundles of human actions and practices in context geared towards the creative evaluation and 
reconfiguration of sources of potentialities into future resources and productive outcomes within 
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the contingency of the moment. Following contemporary practice thinkers (e.g. de Certeau, 1984; 
Dreyfus, 1991; Lave and Wenger, 1991) who conceptualize practices as flexible and relational in 
context, we ontologically treated activities, values and beliefs, relationships, practical ‘coping’ and 
background knowledge as the organizing logics or the components of the field of practices (Coulter, 
2001; Schatzki, 2001) around which foresight as a a social practice, may get constituted, reproduced 
and adapted. Thus, transcending the individual subject to focus on discernable coordinated 
patterns of collective actions and practical activities (Schatzki, 1996), we place primacy not just on 
consciousness, but also on internalized habits, skills and dispositions as well as reflexive awareness 
in theorizing the reproduction of foresightful actions.  
 
Research methodology 
We develop our contribution in the context of the global software industry, since it is characterized 
by complex interaction between rapidly evolving computer technologies and an uncertain fast 
moving market (D’Aveni, 1994; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Hagel and Brown, 2008). We chose 
this industry in order to improve the comparability between cases and offset the effect of industry 
differences (Ellinger et al., 2005). Three firms of comparable size based in the South West of the 
UK, and involved in the pioneering of a series of innovative products for different market 
segments, were selected as our empirical research sites. This enabled comparative analysis between 
the cases used in the study. Since all three organizations were running more than one project, we 
devised the following purposeful sampling criteria (Patton, 2002) to select the four projects 
included in the study so as to reduce variations while enhancing their commonalities (Yin, 2003). 
First, project(s) required the commitment of significant resources to be pioneered. Second, the 
project entailed the development of an innovative product incorporating new or unfamiliar 
technology to the organisation. Third, the project employed Microsoft’s technologies including 
their user and data interfaces in creating the platform architectures on which the products were to 
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be built on. In order to preserve their anonymity, the three organizations go by their pseudonyms: 
Interlab, Kemitech and Mercury.  
Table 1: Comparative biographical sketches of case organisations 
Organization 
(and key facts)  
Area of activity Business sectors Selected project(s)  
Interlab  
[Founded 1991,  
employs 150 staff, 
annual turnover £10m. 
in 2009-10] 
Development of 
specialist software 
applications and 
provision of associated 
services in support of 
these applications. 
Central and local 
Government, utilities,   
emergency services, 
GIS and spatial data 
management, 
bespoke management 
Planning application 
software for national 
sports agency 
 
Kemitech  
[Founded 2000, 
employs 20 staff, 
annual turnover 
£2.5m. in 2009-10] 
Bespoke software 
solutions, development, 
interface engineering, 
high integrity systems 
assurance services 
internet technologies 
and applications. 
Central and local 
government, defence, 
aerospace, and 
transport sectors. 
 
Traffic congestion 
software for local 
government. 
Train graph 
application software 
for rail companies. 
Mercury 
[Founded 1982, 
employs 60 staff, 
annual turnover 
£6.2m. in 2009-10] 
 
Sales and mobile retail 
management solutions, 
investigative software 
independent IT 
networks, hardware and 
the consultancy on best-
fit IT solutions 
Airlines, railways, 
intelligence agencies, 
law enforcement 
agencies, and ferries. 
Investigation 
software for security 
services. 
 
 
 Our chosen level of analysis was the product innovation teams of the various organizations 
because they comprised ‘ordinary’ organizational members located further down in the hierarchy. 
More importantly, they are known to represent the very “level at which observable changes take 
place in the way work is done and the management of innovation process can be witnessed” 
(Birkinshaw et. al., 2008: 282). Serving as the locus for the development of new products and 
services used to drive strategic diversification and corporate renewal (Daneels, 2002; Dougherty, 
1992), the organizations we studied solely relied on their respective innovation teams to exploit 
distributed organizational expertise and limited resources to remain competitive not just in the 
present but also in the future. From this perspective, we argue that innovation teams have an 
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agentic responsibility for making important decisions related to the exploration and exploitation 
of potential future opportunities and limits in their situated practice. The decisions they make in 
their situated practice always imply some assumption about negotiating a successful course into 
the future. In this regard, they are expected (knowingly or unknowingly) to balance their short-
term performance imperatives with the long-term ‘foresightful’ needs of the organization, even 
though they are ‘ordinary’ organizational members located lower down the hierarchy. This appears 
to us as a very interesting problematic which is highly relevant for our chosen level of analysis and 
the context of the present study, given that foresight in innovation teams appears not only as 
essential for practical ‘coping’ but also relevant for organizational foresight.  
 Given the paucity of empirical research emphasizing ‘practice’ as the site for the emergence 
of strategic foresight, an exploratory qualitative research approach was found to be much more 
meaningful and appropriate to advance insight into its enactment in the social context in which 
the innovation teams are embedded (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). In this 
regard, qualitative methods of data collection were adopted to help us capture the actors’ lived 
experiences as well as their inherited knowledge which were of prime importance in generating 
relevant insights into their everyday situated practices. Data for the study were collected over a 
twelve-month period, and we utilized semi-structured interviews as the main data collection 
method. In each company, we interviewed all innovation team members for the specific projects 
under study, as well as their team leaders. A total of 24 interviews were conducted. Interviews 
usually lasted 45-50 minutes and were digitally recorded and transcribed. In addition, to the 
interview data, documentary evidence (e.g. electronic share point, newsletters, and marketing 
materials), which is viewed as a rich source of insight (Adam and Healy, 2000), was collected from 
the case companies to supplement the interview transcriptions and to help build up a solid baseline 
understanding of the various projects, their individual contexts and events which may have 
influenced team members. Furthermore, a total of 20 ethnographical observations of project 
meetings, including observations of informal conversations between team members, allowed us to 
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gather insight into the everyday situated practices of the teams, capturing and deepening our 
understanding of ‘unverbalised’ rules and relevant group norms (Silverman, 1993). The frequent 
informal conversations with members of the innovation teams not only helped to reduce the 
psychological distance between the team members and the investigators to a minimum (Schwartz 
and Schwartz, 1955), but also served as a tool for the identification of recurrent discourse features 
necessary to extend our understanding of the relation between the linguistic form of such texts 
and the broader socio-cultural world in which they were produced. 
 The data collated from disparate sources were then triangulated into a whole (Jick, 1979), 
studied thoroughly and reflected upon to see whether they matched correctly with what was heard 
and seen in the field. Interesting issues raised by research participants were then used to further 
probe the data to match the various accounts of the ‘doings’ and ‘sayings’ of the research 
participants in their situated activities. The full data analysis then followed three steps. First, 
following our theoretical perspective, the initial textual analysis focused on mapping the ‘doings’ 
and ‘sayings’ onto the ‘organizing logics’ of human activities, values and beliefs, relationships, 
practical ‘coping’, and background knowledge.  This was also an opportunity to identify some 
recurrent phrases which were also “analytically converted” (Strauss, 1978: 30) to fit into these 
categories. Here, the analysis explicitly focused on the elucidation of those situated practices that 
had the potential to enable (or impede) foresightful actions, producing a broad range of segments 
that were further categorized based on their similarities and analytical connexions.  
 Drawing on theoretical insight from the extant foresight literature, the identified segments 
were then analysed and interpreted iteratively until common themes emerged and became 
saturated (Ezzy, 2002; Suddaby, 2006). These themes were then sorted, reconstituted (Strauss and 
Corbin, 2008), and indexed to generate the analytical categories of organizing architectures and 
social coordination. Probing further the connections and conceptual properties of the respective 
categories, we developed the thematic frameworks of over-compartmentalization, over-
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determination and (in) congruence-of-values which we used to explore viable theoretical 
explanations. 
Table 2: Emerging themes and their conceptual properties 
 
Emerging themes 
 
Facilitating foresightful action 
 
Constraining foresightful action 
 
 
Over –  
compartmentalisation 
 
Relatively risk free structures of 
engagement which encourages 
experimentation without 
undermining organisational 
stability and business focus. 
 
 
The ghettoization of original 
thought and conceptual 
innovation. A quarantined area 
used to constrain and control 
alternative views alien to 
normative consensus. 
Over –  
determinism 
Contextual integration and 
synthesis of fragmented but 
compelling visions of the yet-to-
be-realized innovation. 
 
Over emphasis on formal 
knowledge and technical rationality 
in the framing of problems and the 
evaluation of future potentialities 
and limits in the present. 
 
(In)congruence -of - 
values 
Creating an idealized vision and 
a shared interpretation of the 
yet-to-be realized innovation 
through knowledge sharing. 
Internalised values that act as 
barriers to open communication. 
The dismissal of alternative and 
evolving value systems more 
reflective of a wider societal trends 
and emerging norms. 
 
 
 Following this, the final categories in the form of thematic frameworks were then applied to the 
entire dataset by annotating them with numerical codes which were also supported with short 
descriptors that elaborate the headings. Indexing here was also about making sense of the gaps 
between identified themes in order to develop a meaningful and more robust understanding of the 
data to enable subsequent interpretation and verification of meanings. Systematic and rigorous 
comparison of the indexed themes with the existing literature enabled us to build up understanding 
of how the various innovation teams experienced the world and the identification of logical 
patterns to produce generalities (Ritchie and Spencer, 1993). Finally, the data was then re-arranged 
under the key themes in a matrix. Typologies were generated and causal association between the 
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various themes were made. Emerging patterns were then used to develop greater insight and form 
descriptive explanations of the enablers and inhibitors of strategic foresight in practice.  
 
Empirical findings: What are the practices that enable (or impede) strategic foresight? 
The analysis of the data collected produced insights regarding innovation teams as a flexible 
organizational subsystem, but one with its own institutionalized organizing practices and 
relationships which include power structures, control systems and rituals (Johnson and Scholes, 
1993). We acknowledge that while members of innovation teams may get caught up in these 
practices and relationships which shape and give rise to what they can or cannot do in their situated 
activities, they are not only continuously replicated through various formal and informal socialities, 
but are also actively reproduced and re-embedded in their everyday situated activities. We present 
these practices and their underlying activities under the general rubrics of organizing architecture 
and social coordination to explore how foresightful actions may be enabled (or impeded) in 
practice. 
 
Organizing architecture 
Organizing architecture as used here refers to the adaptive formal and informal emergent 
structures that govern the situated practices of the various innovation teams. This framing of terms 
is in distinction from Mintzberg’s (1979) perspective on organisational architectures which 
assumes the institutional forms of the object it studied. Following Miller (1993), we argue that the 
organizing architecture of the innovation team is made up of the canonical rules, authority 
relationship, and responsibilities of the members of the innovation team that governs what they 
do in their everyday situated practice. Taken as an expression of an innovation team’s functional 
unity or social life (Barnes, 2001), the conceptual apparatus associated with practice theory (e.g. 
duties, spaces, values, and understandings) become far more apparent. The case evidence shows 
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that these practices in a bounded system interrelate, shape and complement the emergence of 
observed patterns and regularities of actions geared towards the creative exploration and 
exploitation of potential past and future possibilities and limits in the present. From the case 
analysis, the influence of organizing architecture on foresightful action manifests themselves in 
two closely related forms of activities (over-compartmentalization and over-determination) across 
the three innovation teams.  
 
Over-compartmentalization 
While the normative organizing architecture of an innovation team help give form to the 
innovation process, they often resulted in ‘packing’ team members in subgroups or tribes based 
on their roles, duties, relational rights, and functions. Too much emphasis on this structural and 
relational imperative is what we refer to as over-compartmentalization. This organizing 
arrangement, we observed, generates adverse sectional interest and stifles a team’s ability to take 
relevant actions aimed at improving the collective understanding of the cost, returns, efficiency of 
a chosen pathway into the future. Contrary to developing a multiple perspective to solving 
problems, a team member’s perspective is taken seriously only if their contribution is directly 
related to his or her area of professional expertise.  
We may come up with something which technically seems to be a minor problem but 
could still influence the overall performance of the product. The developers will say well, 
it is not really urgent or related to testing for ‘bugs’ and then override that point of view, 
or simply push it back for the next cycle. It is easy for the smaller issues that are important 
to you to get pushed back until you end up in a dilemma. Maybe the tester’s point of view 
could be taken more seriously. They need to bear in mind we are also looking at the bigger 
picture. (Mercury team member A)  
 Our respondent’s views are been neglected because she is deemed to have no technical 
expertise in software interface development which falls beyond the theoretical boundaries of her 
role as a quality assurance officer. While this member may be making a valuable point that could 
bring to fore the weak cues-to-causality, often sidestepped or entirely missed when they appear 
tangential to strategy context (Mackay & Mckiernan, 2004), little effort is expended evaluating the 
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viability of her ‘layman’ inputs. The feeling of alienation experienced by this member and the other 
testers could profoundly limit their ability to think the unthinkable. In the future, they will easily 
succumb to pressures of conformity (Vit, 2007) and seldom challenge the organizational logics and 
processes, especially those that do not fall into their technical area of expertise. As echoed in a 
study by Hodgkinson and Wright (2002), this kind of organizing dynamic tends to promote 
compartmentalized thinking and pluralistic ignorance (Miller and McFarland, 1987), stifles the 
emergence of diverse epistemologies required to shape foresightful actions.  
We need to know exactly what is expected of our products in a few years time or which 
way the products are going to be developed. It’s like the model railway sneaking in through 
the back door and now everyone is committed to working on it without actually knowing 
whether it was the right project to go for. (Kemitech team member A) 
 
 The over-compartmentalization of team members based on their technical expertise also 
suggest that team members are seldom privy to developments in other functional domains 
managed by colleagues on the same project. Since roles are narrowly defined, individual jobs are 
carefully prescribed with no overlaps. Daily jobs are simply parcelled out to members based on 
their core competences. The exploration of identified possibilities in the present then becomes the 
preserve or prerogative of a select few members who are privileged enough to have the idea fall 
within their technical domain. As explained by one respondent: 
Mr. X spends a period of time investigating the technology and developing the product 
concept, at which point all the specifications get written on how the frame should work 
and then it gets thrown at the development team. We are told, “right… implement 
something useful based on this and that”. We then sort of tweak it and just hope it works. 
It just seems odd that everything springs from him, and then we have to put things on to 
it instead of being part of the concept development process. (Mercury team member E) 
 
 There are two issues to unpack here. First, the arrangement described by the respondent 
seems to encourage specialization, and the working patterns give form to the mangle of resistance 
and accommodation that characterize social practices (Pickering, 1993). This expectation is real but 
difficult to realize because it also diminishes the very expertise it aims to reinforce (Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus, 2005). Interestingly, two of the team leaders went to lengths to rationalize these kinds of 
arrangements by arguing that it helps them to control the project ‘scope creeping’ (Purvis and 
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McCray, 1999), quell unnecessary opposing opinions and latent political pressures that have the 
tendency of slowing down the development process. Nevertheless, we found that such 
arrangements often tend to restrict the ability of actors to explore their creative potential beyond 
the theoretical boundaries of their area of expertise (von Krogh and Nonaka, 2000), because the  
team leaders’ construction of social reality, whether good or bad, serves as the template for building 
the desired image of the yet-to-be-realised innovation. Their personal experiences may end up 
blinding them to new and emerging opportunities. In this situation, team members, perhaps with 
the capacity to identify subtle cues and changes in the environment (Weick, 1995), are not 
consulted. Rightly they come to feel that their views are discounted, and as such their identities 
and skills are not only derogated, but also undervalued. Hence, they simply carry out their normal 
duties without necessarily committing to exploring alternative or competing potential futures that 
may come into view. This may lead them to become disenchanted, and adopt a reactive mode of 
‘coping’ with the uncertainties surrounding the technology-market linkage process as a whole. 
 
Over-determinism 
Evidence also emerged that the choice of organizing architecture found in an innovation team 
determines the level of emphasis they place on formal knowledge and reasoning at the expense of 
other ‘ways of knowing’ and imagination when they engage with an unknown future (Mackay and 
McKiernan, 2004b). As argued by Patokorpi and Ahrenainen (2009: 2), “the theory of the 
knowledge society involves an assumption that a capability to procure and to utilize information 
is and will be a core competence of progress, innovativeness and competitiveness”. The quest to 
amass a wide range of information or complete information before taking simple but pragmatic 
intelligent actions is what we refer to as over-determinism. Two members on different teams 
explained: 
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We can adapt the product for other markets, but then we hope the sales and marketing 
guys can identify other markets where it might be a useful solution and we can tailor it.  
That would be the best case scenario. (Mercury team member, D) 
 
We tend to think fairly small scale, adapting the product to improve it but to achieve much 
as the same goal as it is at the moment. It would be the sales people that would come up 
with the radically different ideas that could push the product in a complete new direction. 
If there is a request, the project manager tends to do the overview of plans to take us down 
this direction. After which, we, the programmers, will work around the clock to achieve 
this specific goal. (Kemitech team member B) 
 In essence, while the teams are not involved in developing a bespoke product, they tend 
to channel their visioning efforts and energies into developing their products for particular 
markets. They are implicitly aware that the product could potentially be adapted to other markets, 
but then they expect those with marketing expertise to come to them with some market 
information before they leap into action. This implies viable ideas on alternative markets that may 
come up during their discussions are neither evaluated nor explored in detail as sufficient and what 
they deem as relevant information on their market viability is not ready to hand. Unsurprisingly, 
this approach to organizing, where primacy is placed on rationality, we found, tends to limit the 
ability of team members to take a step back to reflect on alternative actions within a totally new 
frame of reference (Dery, 1983), and often restricted the ability of some of the teams to evaluate 
and choose from alternative futures that could serve as the basis for intelligible actions (Chermack, 
2004). Here, plausible alternative futures which may appear melodramatic or slightly unintelligible 
are discounted. This was usually the case when the team felt their reasonable knowledge of their 
technologies and markets gave them protection from competitive attacks.  
We deal with a very narrow market, which I think in some sense is quite good for us. Like 
I say, we are fairly versatile when it comes to changing the layouts for particular customers. 
It is not like writing something cheap. They couldn’t really do it. Cheapness comes in 
generic forms where you can just sort of write the programme and then mass-produce it. 
For our product, you just cannot simply mass-produce it. (Mercury team leader) 
In a related development, the same team leader goes further to argue persuasively that: 
The customers don’t really care about technology. They want something that works.  The 
only thing that the people who manage the actual software and the database say they do 
care about is: Is it easy to install? Is it easy to add a new one? Is it easy to back up when it 
fails? So, to a large extent again, they don’t really care as long as it is standard Microsoft 
and uses standard tools. That is all that is interesting to them. (Mercury team leader)   
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 Analysis of the extract above reveals how over-determination could cloud the collective 
effort to ‘see’ potential future possibilities in the present. Here, the actors demonstrate some 
penchant for reading evolving technologies and fleeting markets in a one dimensional linear 
manner, and lack the capacity to envision new meanings to create radically innovative, meaningful 
customer experiences and novel capabilities (Verganti, 2008). At the extreme, the evaluation of 
future possibilities and limits in the present may come to rely on advance statistical forecasting, 
and the probing of the consequences of emerging potential futures are based on complex 
quantitative models (Burt and van der Heijden, 2003). The second excerpt specifically 
demonstrates how the context within which firms compete and solve the problems of their 
mainstream customers may contribute to their inability to spot or foresee radical innovations that 
could alter existing technological trajectories (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1996). Here, while 
the over-determination to focus just on the immediate value network may help the team to create 
value by applying customized expertise to clients’ problems, it provides very little space or 
incentive for team members to explore new territories by way of encouraging the enactment of 
foresightful actions that require discontinuous leaps in imagination and creative ordering of 
perceptions of the plausible future (Schwartz, 1991) of their yet-to-be-realized innovations. 
 
Social Co-ordination 
Social co-ordination encompasses the self-regulation of collective social capacities, such as desires, 
interests, values and beliefs of the innovation teams. Following Ellwood (1910: 598), the term 
social co-ordination as used in ordering the analysis of the case evidence refers to “the regularity 
and co-ordination in mental interaction, inter-simulation and response, which brings to unity of 
aim the activities of individuals” engaged in a joint enterprise. Conceptualized as a background of 
practical coping with the uncertainties that characterize rapidly evolving technologies and fleeting 
markets, a team’s social coordination conditioned their ‘staying power’ to explore and exploit 
future opportunities and limits within the contingency of the moment. Moving beyond a truncated 
 19 
 
attribution of social coordination to anxieties, fantasies, expectations and hopes (Loveridge, 2009), 
we identified (in) congruence-of-values as determined by the values, beliefs and cultural orientation 
which constitutively gave form to the prevailing social co-ordinations we observed in the various 
innovation teams. It should be noted that values and beliefs by their social character are flexible 
and transmutable; hence the dispositions and values reported here were not only interpretive and 
embodied, but are more importantly, adaptive.  
 
(In) congruence-of-values 
Values encompass those deep-seated perceptual and cognitive representations of social normative 
beliefs, empathic feelings, motives and needs that drive actions and behaviours. Conceptualized as 
a unique human disposition that influences human behaviour and actions in context (Barnes, 2001; 
Schatzki, 2001), individual values may result in shared and possibly negotiated values and beliefs 
(Mackay and McKiernan, 2004b). In this regard, we found that while the innovation teams’ enacted 
image of the future of the yet-to-be-realized innovation influenced their choice-oriented 
behaviours, their choices about the future were consistent with their collective values and beliefs. 
These collective values and beliefs acted as “a magnet that through its attractive force pulls the 
present [differential visions] towards an envisioned future” (van der Helm, 2009: 101, citing Polak, 
1961) of the yet-to-be-realised innovation. For example, some team members reflecting on their 
personal motivation to work on their respective projects ended up talking about their shared 
values: 
You know, there is always this pressure to deliver on time, but there is a kind of instant 
displeasure if we deliver late. If we deliver something that is poor in quality, the pain just 
goes on for the whole of your life and the life of the product. (Kemitech team member B) 
Most of us really value working on this project because it is going to benefit the public 
somehow. I guess the management of public sports facilities is beneficial, so you know, we 
are making sure the final product is excellent. It is definitely going to do what it is supposed 
to do. We will make sure that it does a little bit more as well, because that is how to make 
a project which really succeeds – give them more than they ask for. (Interlab team member 
D) 
In a related development, the Interlab project leader argued that: 
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People often put in a lot of man-hours if they believe it’s of strategic value to our survival, 
and an added bonus if they feel there is a benefit to humanity. (Interlab project leader) 
 The shared values as espoused by these members are used as a proxy to interpret the teams 
‘commitment’ to their organization’s vision (Buchanan, 1974), indicative of their ability to interpret 
contextual cues and weak signals (Ilmola and Kuusi,2006), re-definition of ideas and the 
imaginative mapping of potential future possibilities within the contingency of the moment. They 
frame their job to develop a future innovative product as a challenge to be mastered rather than a 
threat to be avoided. Here, the shared values may also act as perceptual screens or filters capable 
of influencing peoples’ perception of reality, thereby providing them with necessary meaning for 
the strategic choices and actions they take in their situated practice (van der Heijden, 1996). The 
word ‘believe’, as used by the Interlab project leader, connotes some form of moral dimension to 
defining team members’ propensities to commit to the innovation strategy. These moral codes or 
standards, which probably encouraged team members to ‘believe’ in what they do and commit to 
their responsibilities, could also be deciphered from the shared values and preferences espoused 
by some team members when asked to express their hopes, concerns and anxieties with reference 
to the product under development:; 
Probably, if we all get sued and end up in prison for … I don’t know, some sort of horrible 
liability and indemnity thing because our product totally messed up a serious police 
investigation or our product generated a huge amount of useless data, and that it is all 
entirely our fault and we go to prison. That would be pretty bad. (Mercury Team member 
C) 
There is a company that does a large fire contract for the government. I and my mates 
have consistently refused to work on their project because that company also owns 
companies that make missiles. I was asked and I said, “NO! I am not working for them. I 
am not letting them do a security check on me. I am not letting them have my name, and 
it is not going to happen. I am not going on their books!” (Interlab team member E) 
 According to the principle of alternate possibilities, a person can only be held responsible 
for what they have done only, and only if they could have done otherwise (Frankfurt, 1969). The 
principle implicitly upholds the idea that “no one is ever morally responsible if causal determinism 
were true” (Fischer, 1982: 25). Interestingly, the respondents, by virtue of their moral values, are 
basically claiming responsibility for any success or failure that the future product could produce. 
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They tend to assume their actions today may serve as an antecedent to successful or dreadful 
consequences they are envisaging in the future, even though they do not have absolute control 
over how customers may decide to use the product. Hence, they come to accept that they have a 
moral obligation to explore all avenues and exploit all opportunities available that would improve 
the performance of their product. This goes to confirm that “in morality there is a premium on 
uniformity of moral values, so that we may count on one another’s actions and rise in a body 
against a transgressor” (Quine, 1979: 476). 
  However, these internalized personal predispositions and values which were found to 
support inquiry into identifying future possibilities only affirm ideals and do not provide a holistic 
understanding of the innovation team members’ overall beliefs which are fundamental 
representations of their own environments. For example, most of the values espoused by the 
Kemitech team members working on the defunct model railway project were found to be quite 
antithetical to the enactment of foresightful action. They came to the fore when various team 
members were asked the question: Whose head should ‘roll’ if the team fails to deliver?  
As far as I am concerned, whether it sells or not, I’ve had a great time developing the 
product and it works. It’s not my responsibility to sell that now, and it wasn’t up to me to 
come up with the idea in the first place. That is up to the guy who said we want this model 
railway because we want to take it over there. I have delivered as part of my team, so it’s 
up to them to sell it. (Kemitech team member B) 
 
Another Kemitech team member’s response in relation to the question of responsibility as well as 
future application possibilities of the model railway project had this to say: 
To be honest, I am not a marketer, and I don’t know what the demand is for model 
railways. All I know is that people above me have told me to make this part of it, and so I 
did it because that’s what I am paid to do.  I don’t go home every night and worry that the 
model railway won’t sell, I go home and worry if it won’t work or if there are any problems 
with what I have delivered, it’s not really my area of responsibility to start phoning people 
up and saying, “look, we have this great model railway here, have it”. (Kemitech team 
member C) 
Going a step further to reinforce how incongruence of values could impede ‘thinking the 
unthinkable’, the Mercury project leader in a related development remarked: 
 We are talking with the consultant at the moment who I think would probably say that we 
have never really treated marketing strategically. I guess in some way we are constrained 
 22 
 
by a lack of strategic vision. Anyway, you can say that is really my responsibility as much 
as someone else’s. And that is probably true, although I would probably say, “no; it is the 
MD’s job”. (Mercury project leader) 
 Resolute in their views as to where responsibility lies, the responses given here can be 
described as a form of psychical and defensive avoidance which leads to heightened anxieties in 
engaging with the unknown future. Instead of the team embracing their ‘agentic’ responsibilities 
as a challenge to be mastered, they frame the uncertainties surrounding their environment as a 
threat to be avoided. While the existing organizing architectures may partly account for this ‘buck 
passing’, the prevalence of the unravelling counter-values, we suggest, has a damaging effects not 
just on the identification of perceptual cues, but also on situated integrated set of actions geared 
towards the exploration and exploitation of relevant opportunities for innovation (Sarpong and 
Maclean, 2011). In this regard, we argue that the question of value is more fundamental than the 
question of uncertainty surrounding the innovation process. This is so because the teams’ shared 
values serve as a ‘recipe’ for their actions and judgements (Grinyer and Spencer, 1979) with regard 
to what constitutes potentialities and limits within the contingency of the moment. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Our research highlights how organizing practices can influence organizational foresight. We 
empirically studied how everyday situated practices and their underling activities may constitutively 
strengthen (or hinder) the enactment of foresightful actions in product innovation teams. 
Adopting an exploratory qualitative research approach for the inquiry, three software organizations 
and their four new product innovation projects served as the research sites. Placing ontological 
primacy on taken-for-granted routines and everyday practices resulting from the many activities 
and microscopic behaviours that take place in innovation, data were collected through qualitative 
methods of semi-structured interview, ethnographical observations and the analysis of archival 
documents from the projects. Analysis of the case evidence showed how the practices of 
organizing architectures and social coordination complement and operate in combination to 
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influence organizational foresight. Providing additional insight into how these practices manifest 
themselves, over-compartmentalization, over-determination, and (in) congruence-of-values were 
presented as embedded and intrinsically interrelated activities that act to influence the enactment 
of foresightful action geared towards the creative evaluation and reconfiguration of sources of 
potentialities into future resources and productive outcomes. It should be noted that these 
practices and activities are part of an interlocking appreciative system hence “the shadow of [one] 
is always implicated in the articulation of the other” (Chia, 1998: 4) and they could only be 
identified as praxiological instantiations with reference to the sayings and doings of a group of 
competent actors engaged in their situated activities. 
 The paper makes two main contributions to research in strategic foresight, in particular to 
the literatures on the enactment and failure of organizational foresight. First, tied to an empirically 
grounded understanding of future limits and possibilities in the present, we believe this study to 
be the first explicitly to concentrate on the micro level to explore how taken-for-granted organizing 
routines and practices could influence organizational foresight. In this regard, we have provided 
an empirical response to recent theoretical explications that emphasize the importance of studying 
strategic foresight as a social practice (Cunha et al., 2006; Sarpong, 2011; Tsoukas and Shepherd, 
2004c). Second, our emphasis on the practices of ‘ordinary’ organizational members lower down 
the organization signifies a paradigmatic shift away from managers who are often conceptualized 
as the sole locus of foresight to respond and contribute to past calls and demands for new 
approaches to the study and theorizing of strategic foresight in context that could lead to 
significant knowledge generation in organization science (Fuller and Loogma, 2009; Gracht, et al., 
2010). Nevertheless, the theoretical steps advanced in this paper make no attempt to replace or 
invalidate the cognitive and psychological oriented studies on strategic foresight. Rather, it 
complements them by seeking cumulatively to enrich our understanding of the contribution of 
‘ordinary’ organizational members to organizational foresight. From this perspective, the key 
contribution is in narrowing the epistemic gap between the theory and practice of foresight. 
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 While we acknowledge that the complexity of strategic foresight makes it difficult to 
develop simple managerial recipes, nevertheless the research findings suggest some managerially 
useful insights into the cultivation and management of strategic foresight. First, a lesson from this 
study is that managers need to take micro-level activities and practices seriously because the “future 
of the organisation is the result of the many activities that take place every day in an organisational 
setting” (Cunha et al, 206:196). In passing, one useful advice worth highlighting is that they will 
also have to tightly manage diverging and often conflicting personal values of organizational 
members to reduce ‘benevolent conspiracies’ that have the potential to undermine the envisioned 
future of their yet-to-be-realized innovations. In the broadest sense, choice-oriented behaviours 
of ‘ordinary’ organizational members need to be loosely managed (Peters, 1978; Peters and 
Waterman, 1982), but should also be actively monitored when possible. Second, managers also 
need to pay attention to developing flexible organizing architectures that provide a forum for 
polyphonic voices, often neglected during objective discourse, to be heard. This does not 
necessarily call for the ‘micro-management’ of mundane team practices. Rather, it is more about 
striving to integrate flexible organizing routines and procedures into their organizational processes 
as they seek to “influence the type of future [members] seek to achieve, how they manage their 
resources, the plans and strategies they construct, how much effort they put into their group 
endeavour, their staying power when collective efforts fail to produce quick results or encounter 
forcible opposition and their vulnerability to discouragement” (Bandura, 1997: 478). However, a 
word of caution is also necessary. Harnessing and managing differential values, for example, 
remains a fundamental management challenge. This is because mobilizing team members to 
cultivate the background skill of ‘coping’ that enables them to engage with the future while dealing 
with the challenges they face in their situated activities and personal lives can be counter-intuitive. 
However, it is always possible for management to build and maintain the relevant motivational 
value systems that have the potential to drive the emergence of practices that reward and foster 
foresightful action.  
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 Finally, despite the present study offering several insights into the enablers and barriers to 
strategic foresight, it is not without its limitations. First, because practices by their nature are 
contingent and adaptive over time, care should be taken in generalizing the findings from the study 
to other software organizations or contexts. Second, the study at best can be described as cross 
sectional because of the limited time period over which the various innovation teams were studied 
(Harrigan, 1983). In this case, the lack of a longitudinal perspective (Scandura and Williams, 2000; 
Scott, 1987) suggests that we have only scratched the surface in understanding how situated 
practices enable (or impede) organizational foresight. In this regard, a longitudinal study replicating 
this research may therefore be necessary to ascertain whether additional insights and findings can 
be observed or generated. In addition, such a longitudinal study may also go further to explore the 
impact of foresightful action on organizational performance. This is a line of enquiry which may 
help persuade practitioners and academics alike to pay more attention to mundane practices that 
encourage the cultivation of organizational foresight. The impact of organizational performance 
needs to be understood not in terms of the balance sheet, but mainly in terms of the rate of 
adaptation of routines, practices and processes in response to an ever changing business 
environment. 
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